Elsevier

World Development

Volume 31, Issue 2, February 2003, Pages 325-337
World Development

Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization Program

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00190-0Get rights and content

Abstract

Uganda’s ambitious decentralization program is analyzed in terms of a “Dual-Mode” system of local governance. Under a “technocratic mode,” conditional funding from the center is earmarked for particular programs but with little local participation. In contrast, the “patronage mode” is an elaborate system for local “bottom-up” planning, but with limited resources, which are largely consumed in administrative costs and political emoluments. Along with the spoils of a committee system controlling contracts and appointments, these resources provide the means for building political alliances and loyalty. In the absence of a culture of transparency and civic engagement to assure downward accountability, it remains to be seen whether decentralization can promote both efficient service delivery and local empowerment simultaneously.

Introduction

Since 1986, Uganda has embraced fundamental economic and institutional reforms. One of the most ambitious has been its decentralization policy, held to be one of the most far-reaching local government reform programs in the developing world. Several authors have examined the history and formal structures of the current decentralized system of local government in Uganda (e.g., Mamdani, 1996; Nsibambi, 1998; Tidemand, 1994). However, little attention has been paid to the ways in which these newly established systems actually function at the local level, and the degree to which the original objectives of popular democracy and efficient service delivery have been achieved.

The conventional conception of decentralization comprises a national project, transmitted outward from the capital through the establishment of a set of formal structures and procedures. Actual local government systems are often described in terms of these structures as exemplifying devolution, deconcentration, or a hybrid of the two. In this paper, we complement analysis of structure with attention to both processes and resources. This leads us to characterize Uganda’s decentralization policy in terms of a new model that is qualitatively different from a mixed form of devolution and deconcentration. We show how the combination of formal organizations, resources, and processes of decision making and accountability yields specific distributions of managerial and political power at the local level, conditioned by corresponding public and private incentives. We identify two contrasting forms of local governance in rural areas that we characterize as “technocratic” and “patronage” modes. We further posit that these concurrent modes of governance are founded upon two potentially conflicting ideologies of development. The “technocratic” mode prioritizes poverty reduction, is driven by national targets, and is closely associated with poverty reduction strategy plans (PRSPs). The “patronage” mode draws on the language of participatory planning but, in the context of lack of resources and capture by local elites, is reduced to a ritualized performance with little meaningful citizen involvement. This analysis leads us to question whether the objectives of poverty reduction and community participation can be reconciled in the absence of more effective accountability to the local citizenry.

The present section of the paper lays out the general setting, providing some background to the current system of local government in Uganda and the research area. The operation of the decentralized system at district and lower levels is described in the next section, which draws largely on our research in rural Uganda. The final section presents our conclusions.

Decentralization has several distinct aspects. A common categorization distinguishes political (or democratic) decentralization, administrative decentralization (or deconcentration), and fiscal decentralization (Manor, 1999). Since the 1980s decentralization has been promoted as a solution to many of the problems of administration and governance constraining local and national development, as well as a means of improving performance in poverty reduction (Blair, 2000; Crook & Sverrisson, 2001; Manor, 1999). The benefits of decentralization are considered to include improved efficiency of public service provision, more appropriate services, better governance, and the empowerment of local citizens.

These benefits are held to arise in a number of ways. Devolved decision-making mechanisms can facilitate the active participation of communities, articulating local priorities and helping to ensure that programs are appropriate to local needs. Political decentralization is supposed to carry the potential to create two distinct kinds of accountability: downward between electorate and local politicians, and horizontally between democratically elected local politicians and local administrators. Decentralization is thus considered to be a cornerstone of good governance both in promoting local accountability and transparency, and enfranchising local populations.

Attractive though the potential benefits of decentralization are, numerous studies have shown that they are seldom realized (Crook & Manor, 1998; Moore & Putzel, 1999). Adamolekun (1999, p. 58) goes as far as to conclude that, while decentralization has been included in public sector reform in many sub-Saharan African countries, “there are no real success stories as far as improved development performance at the local level is concerned.” Nickson (1995) argues that despite the widely cited success of Latin American decentralization, there is a wide gulf between the rhetoric and reality of citizen participation.

Why has the experience of decentralization proved so disappointing? Three explanations dominate in the literature: inadequate capacity, insufficient fiscal decentralization, and a lack of accountability to citizens (Johnson, 2002). Certainly, the difficulty of recruiting and retaining skilled staff at district level and below is a widely recognized constraint. But, our research has led us to focus more closely on the interplay of the other two factors: the degree of financial autonomy and the character of local governance.

The extent to which elected local representatives actually control district finances free from central interference is fundamental to the realization of local autonomy. Yet the degree of control which local politicians have over either locally raised revenues or central transfers is never entirely unconstrained, and varies widely. In rural Africa, the local revenue base is often so weak that central transfers dominate district budgets. While a high proportion of central transfers is not as such incompatible with local autonomy, the conditions frequently attached to these transfers can undermine genuine local decision making. Manor (2000), for example, notes that in South Africa the pursuit of redistribution and efficiency goals by central government seriously reduces local government’s independence.

The third constraint identified above, that of accountability, is perhaps the most problematic (Blair, 2000). Political decentralization makes democratic mechanisms the means to ensure and promote downward accountability. Yet, the ballot box is only a part of the wider institutional context: democracy also presupposes access to information, transparent procedures of government and an effective media (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). Certainly politicians or administrators can only be held to account by a citizenry that is active and informed. But, as Mamdani (1996) has argued, the African patrimonial state has perpetuated a rule over subjects rather than a rule by citizens. In such an environment, decentralization may result, in the words of Cross and Kutengule in “repression being brought closer to the people” (2001, p. 6). Introducing decentralization into a political environment characterized by clientage risks strengthening ties of patronage and further entrenching local elites.

Under the colonial system of indirect rule, District Commissioners (DCs) governed through “native authorities” headed by favored traditional chiefs, a system characterized by Mamdani (1995) as “decentralized despotism.”1 During the early independence period, native authorities were abolished, but DCs remained both powerful and centrally appointed. The powers of local government significantly diminished as a result of the 1967 republican constitution and yet further under Amin’s military regime. On its accession to power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), saw decentralization as a “necessary condition for democratization” and hence central to the fulfillment of their goal of establishing a “popular democracy” in Uganda (Kisakye, 1997).

The political context of the NRM era has been a unique system of “no-party” democracy. Given Uganda’s turbulent political history, the NRM leadership has held that multi-partyism would revive ethnic and religious cleavages. The movement system, under which no member can be expelled (in contrast to a one-party system), is meant to ensure that merit rather than political affiliation is the basis of representation. Uganda’s international patrons have looked askance at this system, but brought little pressure on the government to realize pluralism (Hauser, 1999). In these circumstances, decentralization has provided a democratic gloss in the eyes of both international donors and local actors. Over time, however the movement style of politics has begun to take on some of the characteristics of traditional one-party rule (Mamdani, 1995; Odongo, 2000). This includes the use of state resources for the purposes of political mobilization in order to sustain support for the “no-party” system at grass root levels. If, as Blair (2000) argues, the existence of competitive political parties is a necessary requirement for encouraging a culture of local accountability (cf. Crook & Manor, 1998), then the perpetuation of the no-party state in Uganda may severely compromise its development.

The legislative framework of decentralization is provided by the Local Government Statute of 1993, the 1995 Constitution and the Local Government Act 1997 (Uganda, 1993, Uganda, 1995, Uganda, 1997a). These acts converted the existing system of Resistance Councils (RCs), with their origins in the civil war period, to a pyramidal structure of Local Councils (LC) at village (LC1), parish (LC2), subcounty (LC3), county (LC4) and district (LC5) levels.2 Table 1 summarizes key aspects of the decentralized local government system in rural Uganda which has devolved functions, competency and resources to elected local government councils. Administrative and technical personnel are found at the district and subdistrict levels headed respectively by a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and a Subcounty Chief (SCC).

Decentralization comprises an important component of a much wider program of reform undertaken by the Government of Uganda since 1987, encompassing the economic and judicial as well as the administrative and political spheres. In the late 1980s the Government undertook a far-reaching economic recovery program embracing market liberalization through the removal of price controls, the privatization of state industries and the disbandment of agricultural parastatal boards. Average GDP growth of 6.5% per year since 1990 is cited as proof of the success of these programs. There is evidence that the incidence of poverty has fallen from 56% in 1992–93 to 35% in 1992/3. Appleton (2000), attributes this drop entirely to the growth of GDP, though adds a cautionary note that urban-rural inequality over 1992–2000 has increased.

There are three key elements to Uganda’s poverty reduction policy: the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the Poverty Action Fund (PAF), and the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA). Decentralization provides the institutional framework for their implementation. The PEAP represents the Uganda version of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) process common to many developing countries and a prerequisite for qualification for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief. Initiated in 1997, PEAP has four central pillars: creating an enabling environment for economic growth, ensuring good governance and security, promoting the ability of the poor to raise their incomes, and increasing their quality of life (Uganda, 1997b). The PAF finances key poverty eradication programs using funds from the HIPC debt relief initiative and resources mobilized directly from donors. Finally, the PMA is a multi-sectoral program aimed at reducing rural poverty through the commercialization of agriculture (Uganda, 2000). Key features include a grant mechanism for subcounty-level investments, and a shift toward demand-driven extension by vesting budgets in farmer user-groups.

Section snippets

Decentralization: bringing control closer to the people

The fieldwork on which this section is based was undertaken in three districts, Mbale, Kamuli and Mubende, each representing a major rural livelihood system. Three villages were selected in each district, and qualitative and quantitative data collected by a multidisciplinary team of researchers. This research was complemented by interviews at subcounty and district levels with administrators, technical staff and politicians.

Conclusions

On the surface, the mechanisms of decentralization are established and functioning in Uganda, with a five-tier structure of local councils, deconcentrated staff, a bottom-up planning process, and powers to raise and spend local revenue. We have seen however that these structures and processes do not constitute a genuinely participatory system of local governance.

The first problem is one of resources: the local revenue base is weak, and central transfers, as we have seen, are predominantly

Acknowledgements

The research reported in this paper was undertaken as part of the LADDER (Livelihoods and Diversification Directions Explored by Research) research project undertaken jointly by the School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, UK and the Economic Policy Research Centre, Kampala, Uganda, and funded by DFID.

Godfrey Kayobyo and Godfrey Turiho-Ahabwe made particularly valuable contributions to fieldwork. We also acknowledge Dr Godfrey Bahiigwa’s management of the project in Uganda.

References (30)

  • H Blair

    Participation and accountability at the periphery: democratic local governance in six countries

    World Development

    (2000)
  • L Adamolekun

    Public administration in Africa

    (1999)
  • E Ablo et al.

    Do budgets really matter? Evidence from public spending on education and health in Uganda

    (1998)
  • Appleton, S. (2000). Poverty reduction during growth: the case of Uganda, 1992–2000. Nottingham, UK: University of...
  • R Crook et al.

    Democracy and decentralization in South-East Asia and West Africa: participation, accountability and performance

    (1998)
  • Crook, R., & Sverrisson, A. (2001). Decentralisation and poverty-alleviation in developing countries: a comparative...
  • Cross, C., & Kutengule, M. (2001). Decentralization and rural livelihoods in Malawi. LADDER Working Paper No.4....
  • Gaventa, J. & Valderrama, C. (1999). Participation, citizenship and local governance. Background note prepared for...
  • G Harrison

    Post-conditionality politics and administrative reform: reflections on the cases of Uganda and Tanzania

    Development and Change

    (2001)
  • E Hauser

    Ugandan relations with Western donors in the 1990s: what impact on democratisation?

    Journal of Modern African Studies

    (1999)
  • C Johnson

    Local democracy, democratic decentralisation and rural development: theories, challenges and options for policy

    Development Policy Review

    (2002)
  • S.R Karugire

    A political history of Uganda

    (1980)
  • J Kisakye

    Political background to decentralization

  • M Mamdani

    Politics and class formation in Uganda

    (1976)
  • M Mamdani

    The politics of democratic reform? critical reflections on the NRM

    (1995)
  • Cited by (188)

    • Good intentions, bad extension systems? How the ‘Garden Store Approach’ crippled tea expansion in Kigezi sub-region, SW Uganda

      2020, Agricultural Systems
      Citation Excerpt :

      Such farmers stressed that the NBOs who planted for them should have continued to work with them, to implement basic agronomic practices to ensure that the tea matures. Previous studies have shown that development projects that do not actively involve the intended beneficiaries do not often achieve the intended objectives (Francis and James, 2003; Neef and Neubert, 2011). Our interviews with some farmers revealed that NBOs persuaded, coerced or bribed “uninterested” farmers to “offload” their overgrown plantlets into their gardens from the nursery beds – with promises of sharing the payment once the LA fulfilled his obligation.

    View all citing articles on Scopus
    View full text