Table 1

Multitheoretical framework for analysing drivers for and obstacles to IORs in government

Theories	Propositions	Main motivations for coordination	Coordination obstacles
TCE	The costs of the exchange relationship and the need to reduce these costs are the main drivers of coordination mechanisms	Efficiency	High transaction costs are associated with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a contract Opportunism of actors is reinforced by uncertainty and environmental complexity because of the bounded rationality of the options and the ‘small number’ of problem/uncontestable mandates of actors
PAT	Coordination of multisectoral actions requires incentives/sanctions to encourage organisational motivation. Principals apply external controls and contracts to create incentives for agents to coordinate	Power of incentives	Bounded rationality and opportunism of actors and complexity in the performance environment Uncertainty over outcomes Conflicting goals and interests between the principal and the agent Different attitudes toward risk between the principal and the agent
RDT	Organisations seek to find mechanisms to ensure the smooth and predictable flow of external resources from those who control them. The coordination is driven by acknowledgement of interdependence that arise because each actor possesses resources needed by another	Stability of resource flow Interdependence/reciprocity for mutual benefits	Limited acknowledgement of interdependencies Asymmetrical control logics promote competition instead of cooperation
PE perspectives	Coordination dynamics and mechanisms evolve because of a political (contested and negotiated) process Internal politics of coordination unfolds within the dynamic interactions between actors and context Actors are enmeshed within broader structures and complex power, and institutional and ideational contexts that condition their actions. Over time and when conditions are amenable to change, actors’ agency can influence structures and create new structures	Necessity in response to regulatory instruments Legitimacy in response to normative elements Path dependence and institutional structures Power structures and motivations of those that hold vital power for needed actions (resources, positional, knowledge reverence, etc)	Conflicting institutional logics and interests promote organisational silos Multiplicity of power centres arising from institutions, ideas and agents History and normative values for action or inaction

Source: Ssennyonjo et al.
.IORs, interorganisational relationships; PAT, principal–agent theory; PE, political economy; RDT, resource dependency theory; TCE, transaction cost economics.