Network characteristics (type)
Most networks identified were mandated and established either by a government initiative or through a public–private partnership.21–24 In Bolivia and Lesotho, networks were implemented at local level, with a central facility linked to community-based centres.21 25 In Iran and DRC, there was national implementation of networks at the district or provincial level.26 27 Networks in Honduras were also implemented at a provincial level, as part of the national integration of health service delivery networks.17
In terms of size, most networks were established in districts, with emphasis on community-based care, serving population sizes of between 7000 and 140 000 individuals.20 21 24 26 In Iran, complexity of the network structure resulted in network members having large geographical coverage in urban areas.28
The degree of change sought varied between networks. While PCNs in Iran were described as bridging the gap of healthcare access between the rural and urban areas and bringing healthcare to ‘where people live’,18 28 the Lesotho network sought to improve the community’s trust in local healthcare services.22 The networks in Honduras sought to move from a fragmented healthcare system to one with integrated networks17 and the Bolivia network aimed to change the referral structure and thus strengthen primary care.21
Resource availability was linked to the type of partnership (sole or interagency) that led to the network implementation. Regarding staffing, Iran’s networks saw government-led recruitment of staff, including locally recruited community health workers19 26 although there was a shortage of staff directly supporting network goals in some cases.28 Both DRC and Bolivia had network staff recruited by non-governmental organisations (NGOs)20 21 and Lesotho had network staff recruited by the private partner.25 For networks in Honduras, staff were recruited by local governments and NGOs (in decentralised networks), central government (in non-decentralised networks) or a combination of authorities (in mixed networks).17
Budgetary control was in some cases led by government appointed officials, such as in Iran29 30 or enacted through contractual agreements between government and non-governmental entities in the other four country examples.17 20–22 For Iran, this budgetary control was sometimes disproportionate between managers at the network headquarters and managers at health facilities.28
Structures for network governance were clearly defined. The networks in Honduras, Iran and DRC had hierarchical governance structures that mirrored the structure of the respective health systems.24 27 31 PCNs in Lesotho and Bolivia also had hierarchical systems but included an additional hub-and-spoke structure within the network.21 22 In addition, the Bolivia network also had a management contract committee which, together with healthcare providers, was responsible for network governance.21
Focusing on accountability, the Lesotho network included an independent actor responsible for monitoring network indicators in line with the agreed contract.22 In Honduras, decentralised network governance structures evidenced accountability through annual operating plans.17 In Iran, accountability structures followed a hierarchical structure, with health houses/posts reporting to health centres who in turn reported to the district hospital and health centre.26 However, one paper argued that there were many challenges, including unclear scope of accountability, responsibility and authority, heavy administrative burdens and weak monitoring systems.28
Healthcare providers and local or national government entities were key stakeholders in all the included PCNs. All but the Iran PCNs evidenced some form of non-governmental stakeholder group, including faith-based organisations in DRC,20 foreign donors in Lesotho22 and other not-for-profit agencies in Bolivia and Honduras.17 21 In terms of community stakeholders, the Bolivia network was explicit about the inclusion of community members in the management team21; while Iranian networks emphasised the inclusion of locally recruited community health workers in the workforce.26
Evidence regarding power dynamics affecting PCNs was difficult to discern from available sources. However, in Iran, there was a focus on financial, administrative and decision-making power in district network managers and higher authorities, with a suggestion of inadequate power available to managers of health facilities.28 In DRC, it was stated that external non-state partners may introduce vertical programmes that do not harmonise with the wider healthcare strategy.20
Shared management processes were described in three of the networks. Evidence from Iran indicated some initial involvement of communities and local government in rural health system decisions, such as selection of local members for training as community health workers26 but the multiplicity of new programmes, activities and processes increased the complexity of one network’s structure.28 Lesotho evidenced shared processes between the government (funding, supervision and accountability) and the private consortium (health service delivery and maintenance).22 In Bolivia, shared management was between the healthcare provider and the purchase committee, through a management contract.21 In Honduras, the style of service management, that is, whether the network is decentralised, non-decentralised or mixed, is determined if there were shared management processes or not.17 24
Evidence regarding shared learning, shared ideology and developed leadership and management skills was not identified.