Discussion
Research conducted at the Jenner Institute of the University of Oxford led to the development of the ChAdOx vaccine platform on which the Oxford–AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine is built. Our study approximated that public and charitable funding accounted for 97%–99% of the identifiable funding towards the R&D of the ChAdOx technology and its application for SARS-CoV-2 at the University of Oxford until October 2020. Our study identified £104 226 076 of R&D funding reported in FOIs to the University of Oxford and £228 466 771 from the 21% of mentions with a matched grant amount in the scoping review for academic publications on the ChAdOx technology and the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine.
Due to insufficient identifiable information that could link the two datasets, we were not able to cross-match the funding between the academic literature and the FOIs, which is a major limitation of our study. Furthermore, only 21% of exact grant amounts for funder mentions in academic publications were retrievable from publicly available information. Receiving funding information through FOIs was largely successful, making it a useful novel method for reconstructing the cost of R&D for health technologies that are largely developed at public research institutions. However, UK institutions are legally required to spend a maximum of 18 hours collecting the requested data according to the Freedom of Information Act Regulation 4 (2004),24 limiting the scope of these FOI requests. Another limitation of this study is that due to its primary focus on prepandemic academic literature and grants received for SG and AH, funding for manufacturing scale-up and late-stage clinical trials of the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine was outside of our scope. For example, the University of Oxford received at least £65.5 million from the UK Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy for the development of the COVID-19 vaccine and the relevant clinical trials.14 The UKRI database further listed two UKRI grants to the University of Oxford, worth £657 388.25 Additionally, the US government awarded US$125.6 million and over US$1.2 billion in funding to AstraZeneca for vaccine trials, manufacturing, and distribution of vaccine doses to the US government.26 27 A further nine donations totalling £1.8–2.9 million (included in online supplemental file 3) were reported by the University of Oxford in their response to our FOI, two of which came from charitable sources, totalling £50 000–100 000. The remaining seven donations were private or anonymous funders. All nine donations were not integrated into the FOI dataset as exact amounts were not provided and donor names or amounts were missing for 44.4% of donations. There is also circa £18 m worth of funding in the FOI regarding SG and AH that may be linked to the development of the vaccine, consisting of fellowship grants and general vaccine grants with descriptions too vague to attribute them to the development of ChAdOx specifically (listed in full in online supplemental file 3). Our approximation of the cost of the R&D of the ChAdOx technology is therefore conservative, as it most likely excludes important salary costs, some contributions towards the scale-up of manufacturing, and funding for clinical trials to the University of Oxford beyond October 2020.
By applying a methodology that included data collection through two different mechanisms, we are confident to have captured a good approximation of the R&D costs for the ChAdOx vaccine technology at the University of Oxford. However, our study was unable to identify any funding that was received for R&D conducted by Vaccitech, the spin-off company founded in 2016 by SG and AH to further develop the ChAdOx and Modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA) viral vectors.28 This is because it is only possible to send FOIs to public institutions. The private contributions for the complete R&D of the ChAdOx technology might therefore have been higher than identified in our study, which focused on the research conducted at the University of Oxford. Finally, it was not possible to measure relevant non-monetary contributions to the ChAdOx R&D, such as the participation in clinical trials, for example, in South Africa and Brazil for the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine.29 30 Future research should focus on analysing the public and private contribution and risk-taking in the later stages of the R&D of ChAdOx nCoV-19, specifically the funding of clinical trials in humans conducted after the University of Oxford entered an agreement with AstraZeneca.
The lack of transparency around the costs of R&D of novel health technologies is a prevailing issue, with large disparities in estimates reported.31 Although there have been improvements in funding reporting in the past years, there are still major obstacles to investigating the funding of biomedical innovation based on disclosures made in the published scientific literature.32–34 Furthermore, the cumulative nature of scientific research makes it difficult to ascertain the R&D costs of previous innovation, which may have enabled the development of the ChAdOx technology and the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine.33 Of the grant mentions relevant to the R&D of ChAdOx identified through the scoping review, nearly four-fifths could not be matched to an amount using searchable online grant databases. This was because for many of these grants the award number was not given in the funding acknowledgement section of the article, or because the funder had no searchable database in which the exact grant amount was listed. Attempting to match grants without award numbers was unreliable and inconsistent. Another issue was a lack of publicly available grant information of particular types of funders, especially from the two main research institution funding bodies that contributed to the ChAdOx technology based on the funding acknowledgement statements, the Jenner Institute and The Oxford Martin School. Funding amounts from the private sector and PPPs were especially difficult to identify in this study as they usually do not disclose their grants in publicly accessible databases. As a result, the approximation of R&D costs of two decades of research into the ChAdOx technology on the basis of acknowledgements in academic articles is most likely a gross underestimation as only 21% of all mentions could be matched. Furthermore, due to a discrepancy in the titles of grants as disclosed by the University of Oxford in the FOI, which often excluded grant numbers, and the funder mentions in the academic literature, prevented the integration of the two datasets. Therefore, we here present two approximations of the funding of ChAdOx R&D at the University of Oxford. Initiatives to address the lack of transparency in R&D funding have been initiated, such as a 2019 World Health Assembly (WHA) resolution 72.8 which sought to improve ‘the transparency of markets for medicines, vaccines, and other health products’.35 However, the voluntary nature of such initiatives and opposition from the private sector as well as governments of high-income countries limit efforts to increase R&D transparency globally.36
In response to the pandemic, Oxford University Innovation (OUI), a subsidiary of the University of Oxford managing the university’s technology transfer, published a statement committing to non-exclusive, royalty-free licensing and affordable pricing for the duration of the pandemic.37 However, the University of Oxford shortly after releasing this statement entered an exclusive licensing agreement with the British-Swedish pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca for the COVID-19 vaccine.38 39 While AstraZeneca pledged to sell the vaccine globally at no profit during the pandemic, the price of the vaccine reportedly includes a profit margin of 20% on top of the production cost.40 41 The Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine is offered at the lowest price of $5 per course, making it one of the most affordable vaccines available for COVID-19.6 Vaccine prices paid by countries are kept confidential, yet discrepancies in pricing have been reported with some lower-income countries seemingly paying more than higher-income countries.42 AstraZeneca has, in collaboration with the Serum Institute of India, committed a large number of vaccine doses to the COVAX facility.43 However, as of October 2021, AstraZeneca has only delivered 14% of the vaccine doses that were originally promised to COVAX.44Global equitable access is further hindered by bilateral purchasing agreements made between AstraZeneca and countries outside of COVAX.45 Given that the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine price is determined by the pandemic status and SARS-CoV-2 will likely become an endemic virus requiring repeated vaccinations, affordability of the vaccine postpandemic remains a concern.46
Despite a lack of research funding transparency, our findings show the dominance of government and charity funding throughout the R&D process of the ChAdOx technology, which accelerated during the pandemic. Public funding has been especially critical for vaccine research, where the failure rate is as high as 94%, and public risk-taking has enabled the rapid development of many COVID-19 vaccines.19 47 Prior to the pandemic, the ChAdOx technology has been studied in several diseases that the WHO identified as emerging infectious diseases requiring urgent R&D efforts in their Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics48 including Nipah, MERS, and Ebola.49 In addition to government and charitable funders, PPPs are growing global health actors prominent in R&D efforts for diseases endemic to lower-income populations, for which a funding gap prevails.50 51 ,52 These public and charitable funding bodies include governments, charitable organisations, and the PPPs such as CEPI, PATH malaria vaccine initiative and CGIAR. Since the PPPs that contributed to ChAdOx were largely supported by public funding, we categorised them as public in our study.53 To recognise the public contributions and risk-taking in the R&D of the ChAdOx technology on which the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine relies, the benefits of this research should be shared fairly and equitably with the global population.39 54 55 As the ChAdOx vaccine platform is potentially applicable to many more global health challenges beyond the COVID-19, including emerging infectious diseases and pathogens of pandemic potential other than SARS-CoV-2, its mode of technology transfer is of global public health relevance with potential impact for equitable access and affordability of vaccines for other diseases.