Discussion
The current study provides detailed analyses on the distribution of medical care costs, total and major cost categories, paid out-of-pocket by injury patients during hospitalisation in a provincial hospital in Vietnam. We found that the major drivers of medical care costs during hospitalisation were surgery, diagnostic tests/examinations and drugs. These were similar to results in a study of determinants of costs of RTIs in an Indian city.14 Their major cost drivers were also surgery, tests/examinations and drugs. However, the proportions represented by surgery, tests/examinations and drugs were 34%, 24% and 34%, respectively.14 While surgery cost is still the largest proportion in the current study, it seems to vary across settings. In another study on costs of RTIs, falls and burns in India, the proportion of cost for surgery in the total medical care costs was 26%.15
In addition to the significant contribution of surgery to the total costs, we found that a large proportion of these were paid for diagnostic test/examination and drugs. In combination, these two categories contributed nearly 50% of the total. This can be related to an issue commonly found in low-income countries (LMIC), supply of unnecessary care induced by providers. This is common in LMICs because these are where professional regulation and supervision are poorly enforced, the public health sector is underfunded and the providers are mainly paid through a retrospective provider payment mechanism, such as a fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism.16 In Vietnam, the rolling-out of financial autonomy in government hospital policy since early 2000s provides hospital opportunities to generate additional resources. The policy has helped hospitals improving their financial sustainability and able to provide wider range of healthcare services.17 However, to increase revenue, providers tend to overprescribe diagnosis tests, examinations and medications, including costly brand-name drugs.17 ,18 A study of diagnostic testing provides a large variation in the rates of testing cross hospitals in a province, ranging from 0.3 tests per patient visit to 6.4. Among 200 patients who had a CT scan, 80% had an ultrasound. Such level of care was considered excessive and could be related to financial incentives or other non-medical reasons.19 In terms of drug use, Nguyen et al20 found that in 2005, medicine normally accounted for over 50% of total household total healthcare expenditure. In addition, low-price generic drugs were generally less available in public sector facilities than brand-name drugs and patients usually paid 46.6 and 11.4 times the international reference prices for brand-name and generic drugs, respectively.20 ,21 Although we were unable to explore this in more detail, it is a plausible mechanism for the high costs for diagnostic test/examination and drugs in this study.
Hospitalisation creates a significant financial burden to the family. Earlier work from the same cohort shows that as many as 27% of families faced catastrophic expenditure and the risk was even higher for those without health insurance.5 However, analyses of the effect of health insurance on the three major costs drivers in the current analysis indicate that there was no statistically significant difference for each of the cost categories between patients with and without health insurance. Health insurance was introduced at around the same time as the hospital user fee in early 1990s. It is meant to be a mechanism to protect patient from financial burden resulted from the introduction of the user fee. However, after nearly 20 years of implementation and continuous amendments, a number of studies have indicated the modest benefits of health insurance in helping patients away from catastrophe of medical expense.22–24 In fact, out-of-pocket payment was too high23 and no statistically significant effect of health insurance on the level of out-of-pocket payment was found. In addition, payments, Nguyen22 did not find any.
In another study using data from five Vietnam Living Standard Surveys from 2002 to 2010, Hoang et al revealed that the financial protection functionality of the health insurance in Vietnam was limited and not consistent over time. The statistically significantly lower rates of catastrophic expenditure among household with health insurance were found only in 2004 and 2006.24 The current study provides another evidence of the uncertainty, specifically for injury treatment, in the capacity of health insurance in protecting patients from high costs.
Our study also shows a low level of health insurance usage. While the Ministry of Health claimed that the national coverage of health insurance was 61% by 2010,8 in this study, only 25% of study participants reported to have their insurance. The cumbersome procedures to access insurance benefits are often reported as the reason why patients did not use their insurance. Rather than risking a longer wait time and lower quality of care, some insured patients may just forgo all insurance benefits and incur full out-of-pocket payment.25 From the provider perspective, a disincentive to treat insured patients exists because of the inappropriate fee structure and the way providers are reimbursed. Partial payments from users and health insurance reimbursement are not always sufficient to cover the costs of providing healthcare services.7 Such differential treatment between insured patients, particularly those with low premiums, and private fee-paying patients would strongly influence their decision to use or not to use their insurance.
While revealing important findings on medical care cost categories and role of health insurance for injury treatment, it is also important to note some study limitations. First, our study reported only participants' out-of-pocket payments during their hospitalisation. These were not the actual costs paid to the hospital because the amount that hospital would be reimbursed by insurance was not included. This is because our focus was to measure the financial burden to the patients and their families. The actual costs would be higher than our estimates if all costs were included. Second, the analyses for specific schemes of health insurance were not conducted because participants' exact health insurance scheme was not available. While many schemes exist, they can be grouped in four major categories, including the compulsory health insurance (covering formal-sector employees, retirees, the disabled, veterans and their dependents), voluntary health insurance (opening to not eligible for coverage under compulsory health insurance), health insurance for the poor and free health insurance for children under 6.7 Their level of reimbursement or out-of-pocket payment would vary depending on the scheme they were on. The lack of this information, a kind of endogeneity bias, would potentially understate, especially when the insurance reimbursement was significant, the effect of insurance status on out-of-pocket payments.